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Abstract. We propose a simple and intuitive cost mechanism which as-
signs costs for the competitive usage of m resources by n selfish agents.
Each agent has an individual demand; demands are drawn according to
some probability distribution. The cost paid by an agent for a resource
she chooses is the total demand put on the resource divided by the num-
ber of agents who chose that same resource. So, resources charge costs
in an equitable, fair way, while each resource makes no profit out of the
agents.
We call our model the Fair Pricing model. Its fair cost mechanism in-
duces a non-cooperative game among the agents. To evaluate the Nash
equilibria of this game, we introduce the Diffuse Price of Anarchy, as an
extension of the Price of Anarchy that takes into account the probability
distribution on the demands. We prove:
– Pure Nash equilibria may not exist, unless all chosen demands are
identical. In contrast, we have been able to prove that pure Nash
equilibria do exist for two closely related cost sharing models, namely
the Average Cost Pricing and the Serial Cost Sharing models.
– A fully mixed Nash equilibrium exists for all possible choices of the
demands. Further on, the fully mixed Nash equilibrium is the unique
Nash equilibrium in case there are only two agents.
– In the worst-case choice of demands, the Price of Anarchy is Θ(n);
for the special case of two agents, the Price of Anarchy is less than
2− 1
m
.
– Assume now that demands are drawn from a bounded, independent
probability distribution, where all demands are identically distributed
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and each is at most a (universal for the class) constant times its ex-
pectation. Then, the Diffuse Price of Anarchy is at most that same
constant, which is just 2 when each demand is distributed symmet-
rically around its expectation.
Keywords. Cost Sharing, Diffuse Price of Anarchy, Fair Pricing, Re-
sources
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation, Framework and Overview
We propose and analyze a very simple and intuitive cost mechanism for pricing
the competitive usage of a collection of m resources by a collection of n selfish
agents, each coming with an individual demand. Demands are drawn according to
some (perhaps unknown) probability distribution. This assumption is suitable for
many practical situations (e.g., selfish sharing of bandwidth) where repeatedly
revealing the demands allows their statistical modeling.
The key feature of our mechanism is its reliance on a very natural fairness
principle in cost sharing. Namely, the cost charged to an agent for a resource
she chooses is the total demand on the resource divided by the number of agents
who chose that same resource; we call it Resource Cost.
Such a cost mechanism represents a very natural sharing scheme that is of-
ten used in real life; for example, restaurants offering an “all-you-can-eat” buffet
charge a fixed price to each customer, which is calculated to alleviate all restau-
rant costs over customers. Moreover, Internet service providers and operators in
telecommunication networks often charge a flat amount in case the demands of
agents on bandwidth do not differ much – see, for example, [19,20], or the more
recent [18] and references therein. Moreover, this cost mechanism represents a
fair pricing scheme since no resource makes any profit by overcharging, while all
agents sharing the same resource are treated equally.
In reflection to the fairness principle encapsulated in its cost mechanism, our
pricing model will be coined as the Fair Pricing model. Its fair cost mechanism
induces a non-cooperative strategic game, which we call FairPricingGame, whose
players and strategies are the agents and resources, respectively. We analyze the
Nash equilibria [16] (both pure and mixed) for FairPricingGame; roughly speak-
ing, these are stable states from which no agent has an incentive to unilaterally
deviate. In particular, we consider the fully mixed Nash equilibrium where each
agent selects each resource with non-zero probability. While offering in addition
an advantage with respect to convenience in handling, the fully mixed Nash
equilibrium is suitable for our economic framework under the very natural as-
sumption that each resource offers usage to all agents without imposing any
access restrictions.
We define Optimum as the least possible maximum (over resources) Resource
Cost; for a Nash equilibrium, we define Social Cost as the expectation, over
random choices of the agents, of maximum (over resources) Resource Cost. We
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observe that Optimum is achieved when all agents choose the same resource
(Proposition 1).
The Price of Anarchy [9,17] is the ratio of Social Cost over Optimum in the
worst-case pair of chosen demands and Nash equilibrium. To evaluate the Nash
Equilibria of the FairPricingGame, we use both the Price of Anarchy and the
Diffuse Price of Anarchy, an extension of the former, which we introduce to ac-
commodate the (arbitrary but specific) probability distribution on the demands.
1.2 The Diffuse Price of Anarchy
The main argument for using worst-case demands in the definition of the Price
of Anarchy [9] is that the distribution of the demands is not known. However,
the Price of Anarchy takes this argument way too far. It assumes that nothing
is known about the distribution, so that any distribution on the demands is
possible. The worst-case distribution prevailing in the definition of the Price of
Anarchy is the one in which the worst-case demand occurs with probability one.
We extend this definition to remove this assumption while avoiding to assume
full knowledge about the distribution of demands. Roughly speaking, the Diffuse
Price of Anarchy is the worst-case, over all allowed probability distributions, of
the expectation (according to each specific probability distribution) of the ratio
of Social Cost over Optimum in the worst-case Nash equilibrium.
1.3 Summary and Contribution
We prove that the FairPricingGame may not have a pure Nash equilibrium un-
less all chosen demands are identical (Theorem 1). The proof argues that the
Resource Costs of all resources are identical in a pure Nash equilibrium. In con-
trast, we have been able to prove the existence of pure Nash equilibria for two
other cost sharing models, namely the Average Cost Pricing [1] and the Serial
Cost Sharing [14,15] models (Theorems 2 and 3).
On the other hand, we show that, for the Fair Pricing model, a fully mixed
Nash equilibrium always exists (Theorem 4). For the case of two agents, we
prove that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium
(Theorem 5).
We next prove that the Price of Anarchy can be as large as Θ(n); we establish
both lower and upper bounds (Theorems 6 and 8). A tighter analysis applies to
the case of two agents to yield that the Price of Anarchy is then less than 2− 1m
(Theorem 7).
To mitigate the high Θ(n) bound on the Price of Anarchy, we seek structure
in the probability distributions of demands. The outcome has been the identifi-
cation of an interesting class of probability distributions on demands for which
the Diffuse Price of Anarchy is upper bounded by a constant (Theorem 9). This
is a very simple but broad class of so called bounded, independent probability dis-
tributions – there, roughly speaking, demands are independent and identically
distributed, while each demand may not exceed a universal for the class constant
4 M. Mavronicolas, P. N. Panagopoulou, P. G. Spirakis
times its expectation. Under the additional assumption that each demand is sym-
metrically distributed around its expectation, this universal constant is just 2.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to prove something nontrivial
about an averaged Price of Anarchy such as the Diffuse Price of Anarchy we
have introduced.
1.4 Related Work
Our Fair Pricing model is partly motivated by the KP model [9] for selfish rout-
ing; there is a vast volume of research about selfish routing with unsplittable
demands (see, e.g., [2,3,4,8,9,11]). The KP model overcharges the total demand
on a resource to each and every agent choosing the resource. To the best of
our knowledge, our Fair Pricing Model is the first work to explicitly formulate
and evaluate, using the Price of Anarchy, a theoretical model of cost sharing
with resources and selfish agents that charges the fair share of the total demand
to each agent choosing the resource; of course, proportional cost sharing mod-
els such as ours have been considered before in Computer Science (e.g., in the
microprocessor scheduling/sharing model).
Studied in the Economics literature are several pricing models similar to
(but different than) our Fair Pricing model. These pricing models have mostly
considered an economic system with a single resource and multiple agents, each
choosing its individual demand as its strategy; these models have addressed the
problem of identifying the most suitable cost function for the single resource
according to several axiomatic criteria, such as monotonicity and envy-freeness.
Two prominent examples of such pricing models are Average Cost Pricing [1]
and Serial Cost Sharing [14,15]; they will be discussed in more detail in Sect. 2.
The essential differences between our Fair Pricing model and those studied in the
Economics literature are that we consider multiple resources (albeit identical)
and we model the strategy of an agent as some resource. As a result, associated
with the two approaches are different notions of equilibria exhibiting different
properties.
The Price of Anarchy was originally proposed by Koutsoupias and Papadim-
itriou, and further advocated by Papadimitriou [17], as a measure of performance
degradation in systems with resources shared by selfish agents. The Diffuse Price
of Anarchy is motivated by the Diffuse Adversary studied by Koutsoupias and
Papadimitriou [10] as an alternative to worst-case adversaries usually considered
for competitive analysis in online computing. So, Diffuse Competitive Ratio is
to Competitive Ratio in Online Computing what Diffuse Price of Anarchy is to
Price of Anarchy in Selfish Computing.
The fully mixed Nash equilibrium was originally proposed by Mavronicolas
and Spirakis [13]; its various existence and uniqueness properties were subse-
quently studied very extensively; see, e.g., [3,4,5,11,12]. Coordination mecha-
nisms [2] are another means for reducing the Price of Anarchy.
Hayrapetyan et al. [6] presented and analyzed (using the Price of Anarchy)
a pricing game to capture the interaction between service providers and users
over the Internet. Their pricing model addresses the competition of network
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managers for users via prices and the quality of service provided; it addresses
neither fairness nor distributions on demands, which are the two main ingredients
of our model.
Organization. Section 2 introduces the Fair Pricing model and summarizes some
preliminary facts. Pure Nash equilibria and fully mixed Nash equilibria are
treated in Sect. 3 and 4, respectively. Sections 5 and 6 present our results for the
Price of Anarchy and the Diffuse Price of Anarchy, respectively. We conclude,
in Sect. 7, with a discussion of our results and suggestions for further research.
2 The Fair Pricing Model
Our Fair Pricing model was originally motivated by the standard KP model for
selfish routing [9]; it departs from it by encompassing some stochastic assump-
tions on user demands, and notions of pricing and fairness as well.
Notation. For an event E in a sample space, denote Pr{E} the probability
of event E occurring. For a random variable X that follows the probability
distribution D, denote ED(X) the expectation of X (according to the probability
distribution D). For any integer m ≥ 2, denote [m] = {1, . . . ,m}.
Agents and Resources. We consider a collection M = {1, 2, . . . ,m} of identical
resources, and a collection N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of agents. Associated with an agent
i ∈ N is a demand wi ∈ IR+. We assume that demands are chosen according to
some (known) joint probability distribution D, which comes from some (known)
class ∆ of possible distributions. We consider D to be the steady state distribu-
tion of some ergodic stochastic process that generates demands. We will often
fix a particular outcome of the experiment of choosing demands (according to
D), which is a n × 1 demand vector w. Denote W = ∑i∈N wi and Ŵ = Wn .
Note that wi
Ŵ
≤ n for all agents i ∈ N . We will be assuming, without loss of
generality, that w1 ≥ w2 ≥ . . . ≥ wn. We usually use subscripts for agents and
superscripts for resources.
Strategies and Assignments. A pure strategy for agent i ∈ N is some specific
resource; a mixed strategy for agent i is a probability distribution on the set of
pure strategies. A pure assignment L ∈Mn is a collection of pure strategies, one
per agent. Similarly, a mixed assignment P is a collection of mixed strategies,
one per agent. A mixed assignment is represented by an n×m probability matrix
P of mn probabilities pji , i ∈ N and j ∈ M, where pji is the probability that
agent i selects resource j. Clearly, for each agent i ∈ N , ∑j∈M pji = 1. For
each agent i ∈ N , the support of agent i in the mixed assignment P is the set
of resources Si = {j ∈ M | pji > 0}; thus, the support of agent i is the set of
resources which i chooses with non-zero probability. P is fully mixed [13] if for
all agents i ∈ N and resources j ∈ M, pji > 0; thus, each agent selects each
resource with non-zero probability.
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Resource Demand, Resource Congestion, Resource Cost, Individual Cost and
Resource Profit. Fix a pure assignment L = 〈l1, l2, . . . , ln〉 and a resource j ∈M.
Define the Resource Demand on resource j, denotedW j(L), as the total demand
on resource j; that is, W j(L) =
∑
k∈N :lk=j wk. Define the Resource Congestion
on resource j, denoted nj(L), as the total number of agents on resource j; that
is, nj(L) =
∑
k∈N :lk=j 1 = |{k ∈ N | lk = j}|. The Resource Cost on resource j,
denoted RCj(L), is the ratio W
j(L)
nj(L) if n
j(L) > 0, and 0 otherwise. The Individual
Cost for agent i ∈ N , denoted ICi(L), is defined to be RCli(L); so, ICi(L) =
W li (L)
nli (L)
, and the Individual Cost of agent i is the Resource Cost of the resource
she chooses. Although Individual Cost is identified with Resource Cost in the
specific case of the Fair Pricing model considered here, this may not be true in
general. So, we chose to introduce both in order to offer convenience to future
cost sharing models that will explicitly distinguish between them.
The Resource Profit of resource j ∈M, denoted RPj(L), is defined as RPj(L)
=
∑
k∈N :lk=j ICk(L) −W j(L); intuitively, the profit of a resource is the total
cost it charges to agents choosing it minus the total demand it serves. This
definition is very general since it applies to all possible specifications of Individual
Cost. Clearly, for the specific way we defined Individual Cost in this work, all
Resource Profits are zero. However, we still chose to introduce Resource Profit as
an important metric for general theoretical models of cost sharing, even though
it happens to be zero in the specific case of the Fair Pricing model considered
here. We believe that Resource Profit merits explicit investigation in other cost
sharing models as well. We often drop the arguments of the various costs when
these are clear from context.
Other Cost Sharing Models. Similar cost sharing models from the Economics lit-
erature have considered Resource Costs and Individual Costs similar to the ones
we employed in our Fair Pricing model. We will comment (using the terminology
adopted in this work) on the two most closely related ones, namely the Average
Cost Pricing [1] and the Serial Cost Sharing [14,15] models. Both of them use a
nondecreasing Cost Function Cl for each resource l ∈ [m], and take as Resource
Cost the value Cl(
∑
k∈N :lk=l wk). This value is different than the Resource Cost
adopted here, even if Cl is the identity function. The crucial difference is that
the latter depends on (in particular, decreases with) the Resource Congestion for
resource l, while the former ignores Resource Congestion completely. Moreover,
both models seek ways to share the Resource Cost Cl(
∑
k∈N :lk=l wk) among the
selfish agents choosing the resource l.
– In the Average Cost Pricing model [1], the Individual Cost of agent i ∈ N
choosing resource l ∈M in the pure assignment L is
ICi(L) =
wi∑
k∈N :lk=l wk
Cl(
∑
k∈N :lk=l
wk) .
– In the Serial Cost Sharing model [14,15], there are intuitive, systematical
formulas for the Individual Costs of the agents choosing a resource l ∈ M,
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which we will first demonstrate for the special case of three agents with
demands w1 ≤ w2 ≤ w3. We refer to a pure assignment L. The Individual
Cost of agent 1 with the smallest demand is IC1(L) =
Cl(3w1)
3 . This is
similar to (but different than) the fair share of Resource Cost employed in
the Fair Pricing model, and it depends on the Resource Congestion (equal
to 3) in a way identical to the one in our model. This is not true for the rest
of the agents. The Individual Cost of agent 2 is
IC2(L) =
Cl(w1 + 2w2)− IC3(L)
2
=
Cl(w1 + 2w2)
2
− C
l(3w1)
6
.
Finally, agent 3 pays the rest of Resource Cost, and this is calculated to be
IC3(L) = Cl(w1 + w2 + w3)− C
l(w1 + 2w2)
2
− C
l(3w1)
6
.
Now for the general case where nl agents with weights wl1 ≤ . . . ≤ wlnl choose
resource l ∈M, the Individual Cost of agent i ∈ [nl] is
ICi =
i∑
k=1
Cl
(
wl1 + · · ·+ wlk−1 + (nl + 1− k)wlk
)
nl + 1− k
−C
l
(
wl1 + · · ·+ wlk−2 + (nl + 2− k)wlk−1
)
nl + 1− k .
All Individual Costs depend on Resource Congestion, but in a way much
more involved (but probably noteworthy) than the one in our Fair Pricing
model. The Serial Cost Sharing model reflects the principle that the Indi-
vidual Cost of an agent does not depend on user demands that are larger
than its own; this principle is violated in the Fair Pricing model.
Expectations in Mixed Assignments. For a mixed assignment P, all resource de-
mand, resource congestion and Resource Cost become random variables induced
by the probability distribution P. We define the expected resource demand, the
expected congestion demand and the Expected Resource Cost as the expectations
of resource demand, resource congestion and Resource Cost, respectively, ac-
cording to P. The Conditional Expected Individual Cost ICji of agent i ∈ N on
resource j ∈ M is the conditional expectation of the Individual Cost of agent i
had she been assigned to resource j. The Expected Individual Cost ICi of agent
i is the expectation of her Conditional Expected Individual Cost on a resource;
so, ICi =
∑
j∈M p
j
i IC
j
i .
Nash Equilibria. The definition of Expected Individual Cost completes the def-
inition of a strategic game that models fair pricing of resource usage, which we
call FairPricingGame. We are interested in the induced (both pure and mixed)
Nash equilibria [16] of FairPricingGame. Formally, the pure assignment L is a
pure Nash equilibrium if for each agent i ∈ N , the Individual Cost ICi(L) is
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minimized (given the pure strategies of the other agents); thus, no agent can
unilaterally improve her own Individual Cost. The mixed assignment P is a
mixed Nash equilibrium if for each agent i ∈ N , the Expected Individual Cost
ICi(L) is minimized (given the mixed strategies of the other agents); thus, no
agent can unilaterally improve her own Expected Individual Cost. The partic-
ular definition of Expected Individual Cost implies that for each agent i ∈ N ,
for each resource j ∈ M such that pji > 0, all Conditional Expected Individual
Costs ICji are the same and no more than any Conditional Expected Individual
Cost ICli with p
l
i = 0.
Social Cost and Optimum. We proceed to define Social Cost, Optimum and
the Price of Anarchy for the specific FairPricingGame we consider. Associated
with a mixed Nash equilibrium P is the Social Cost SC(w,P), which is the
expectation, over all random choices of the agents, of the maximum Resource
Cost; thus, SC(w,P) = EP
(
maxj∈M RCj
)
. By definition of Resource Cost, we
may explicitly write,
SC (w,P) =
∑
〈l1,l2,...,ln〉∈Mn
n∏
i=1
plii max
j∈M
{ ∑
k∈N :lk=j wk
|{k ∈ N : lk = j}|
}
.
On the other hand, the Optimum associated with a demand vector w, denoted
OPT(w), is the least possible, over all pure assignments, maximum Resource
Cost; thus, OPT(w) = minL∈Mn maxj∈M RCj(w,L), and explicitly,
OPT (w) = min
〈l1,l2,...,ln〉∈Mn
max
j∈M
{ ∑
k∈N :lk=j wk
|{k ∈ N : lk = j}|
}
.
Proposition 1. For any demand vector w, OPT(w) = Wn .
Proof. Fix any demand vectorw. Clearly, the pure assignment σ where all agents
are assigned to the same resource achieves Social Cost Wn . Since σ is no better
than the optimal assignment, it follows that OPT(w) ≤ Wn . So, it only remains
to prove that OPT(w) ≥ Wn .
Consider any arbitrary assignment α. Let resource l ∈ [m] be such that
SC(w, α) = W
l(α)
nl(α)
. By definition of Social Cost, it follows that for any resource
j ∈ [m] such that nj > 0,
W l(α)
nl(α)
≥ W
j(α)
nj(α)
or
nj(α)
nl(α)
≥ W
j(α)
W l(α)
.
Summing up over all such resources j ∈ [m] yields that∑
j∈[m]:nj>0
nj(α)
nl(α)
≥
∑
j∈[m]:nj>0
W j(α)
W l(α)∑
j∈[m]:nj>0 n
j(α)
nl(α)
≥
∑
j∈[m]:nj>0W
j(α)
W l(α)
.
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Hence, it follows that W
l(α)
nl(α)
≥ Wn . By choice of resource l, this implies that
SC(w, α) ≥ Wn . Since α was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that minα SC(w, α) ≥
W
n or OPT(w) ≥ Wn , as needed to complete the proof. uunionsq
Price of Anarchy and Diffuse Price of Anarchy. The Price of Anarchy (also
referred to as Coordination Ratio [9]), denoted PA, is the maximum value, over
all demand vectors w and (mixed) Nash equilibria P, of the ratio SC(w,P)
OPT(w) .
Proposition 1 immediately implies that
PA = max
w,P
( n
W
· SC(w,P)
)
.
The Diffuse Price of Anarchy for the class ∆ is given by
DPA∆ = max
D∈∆
(
ED
(
max
P
SC(w,P)
OPT(w)
))
.
Each fixed but arbitrary demand vector w induces a candidate value for the
Price of Anarchy (corresponding to the worst-case Nash equilibrium associated
withw), which is a function of the particular demand vector. Now, each fixed but
arbitrary probability distribution D induces an expectation on this value, which
is a function of the particular probability distribution D. Finally, the maximum
of these expectations, over all possible probability distributions, is the Diffuse
Price of Anarchy. Proposition 1 immediately implies that
DPA∆ = max
D∈∆
(
ED
( n
W
(
max
P
SC(w,P)
)))
.
3 Pure Nash Equilibria
3.1 Fair Pricing Model
For the FairPricingGame we defined in the previous section, we prove:
Theorem 1. There is a pure Nash equilibrium if and only if all demands are
identical.
Proof. Assume first that all demands are equal to w, i.e. all demands are iden-
tical. Then, in any pure Nash assignment, the Resource Cost on each resource j
such that nj > 0 is equal to w, which implies that all Individual Costs are also
equal to w. Hence, every pure assignment is a Nash equilibrium.
Assume now that there is a pure Nash equilibrium L. For each resource j ∈
M, denote wj1, . . . , wjnj the demands assigned to resource j. So,
∑
1≤k≤nj w
j
k =
W j . Fix now a resource j ∈ M with nj > 0. Since L is a Nash equilibrium,
for each agent k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nj} assigned to resource j, and for each resource
l ∈ M, l 6= j, it holds that ICjk ≤ IClk or W
j
nj
≤ W
l + wjk
nl + 1
. Summing up over
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all such agents k yields that W j ≤ njW l
nl + 1
+ W
j
nl + 1
. Rearranging terms yields
that nlW j ≤ njW l. This implies that for any pair of resources j, l ∈ M with
nj , nl > 0, W
j
nj
= W
l
nl
.
Note now that for each agent k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nj}, w
j
k
nl + 1
≥ W j
nj
− W l
nl + 1
. We
consider the implications of this inequality in two possible cases.
– Assume first that nl = 0 (in which case W l = 0 as well). Then, wjk ≥ W
j
nj .
– Assume now that nl > 0. In this case, recall that W
j
nj =
W l
nl
. So, the inequality
implies that w
j
k
nl+1
≥ W l
nl
− W l
nl+1
= W
l
nl(nl+1)
, implying that wjk ≥ W
l
nl
= W
j
nj .
So, in all cases, wjk ≥ W
j
nj for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nj}. This implies that wj1 = wj2 =
. . . = wjnj =
W j
nj . Since, however,
W j
nj =
W l
nl
for any pair of resources j, l ∈ M
with nj , nl > 0, it follows that all demands are identical, as needed. uunionsq
3.2 Average Cost Pricing
Now consider a special case of the Average Cost Pricing model, where C`(·) =
C(·) for all ` ∈ M and C(·) is an increasing, concave function in [0,∞) with
C(0) = 0. Then
Theorem 2. There are exactly m pure Nash equilibria for the Average Cost
Pricing model. Namely, a pure assignment L is a pure Nash equilibrium if and
only if `i = ` ∀i ∈ N , for some ` ∈M.
Proof. Assume that w1 ≥ w2 ≥ · · · ≥ wn and denote W =
∑n
i=1 wi. Assigning
all agents on the same resource ` ∈ M is a pure Nash equilibrium, since for all
i ∈ N , j 6= ` ∈M it holds that
C(W )
W
≤ C(wi)
wi
⇐⇒ wi
W
C(W ) ≤ wi
wi
C(wi) .
It remains to prove that there exists no pure Nash equilibrium L such that
`i 6= `j for some i, j ∈ N . Assume by contradiction that there exists such a pure
Nash equilibrium. Then
wi
W `i
C(W `i) ≤ wi
W `j + wi
C(W `j + wi)
C(W `i)
W `i
≤ C(W
`j + wi)
W `j + wi
W `i ≥W `j + wi .
Similarly
W `j ≥W `i + wj ,
implying that wi + wj ≤ 0, a contradiction. uunionsq
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3.3 Serial Cost Sharing
Similarly, consider a special case of the Serial Cost Sharing model, where C`(·) =
C(·) for all ` ∈ M and C(·) is an increasing, concave function in [0,∞) with
C(0) = 0. Then
Theorem 3. There exists a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let w1 ≤ w2 ≤ · · · ≤ wn and assume that all agents choose the same re-
source. We will prove by induction on i that ICi ≤ C(wi), so that this assignment
be a pure Nash equilibrium. For 1 ≤ t ≤ n denote Wt =
∑t
i=1 wi.
– For i = 1, IC1 =
C(nw1)
n ≤ C(w1), since C(·) is concave.
– Suppose that ICt ≤ C(wt) for some 1 ≤ t < n.
– Then
ICt+1 =
t+1∑
k=1
C (Wk−1 + (n+ 1− k)wk)− C (Wk−2 + (n+ 2− k)wk−1)
n+ 1− k
=
t∑
k=1
C (Wk−1 + (n+ 1− k)wk)− C (Wk−2 + (n+ 2− k)wk−1)
n+ 1− k
+
C (Wt + (n− t)wt+1)− C (Wt−1 + (n+ 1− t)wt)
n− t
= ICt +
C (Wt + (n− t)wt+1)− C (Wt + (n− t)wt)
n− t
≤ C(wt) + C (Wt + (n− t)wt+1)− C (Wt + (n− t)wt)
n− t .
If wt+1 = wt then ICt+1 = ICt ≤ C(wt) = C(wt+1). Now assume wt+1 > wt. In
that case, Wt + (n − t)wt+1 > Wt + (n − t)wt > wt. Since C(·) is concave, it
follows that
C(Wt + (n− t)wt+1)− C(Wt + (n− t)wt)
Wt + (n− t)wt+1 −Wt − (n− t)wt ≤
C(Wt + (n− t)wt+1)− C(wt)
Wt + (n− t)wt+1 − wt
or equivalently
C(Wt + (n− t)wt+1)− C(Wt + (n− t)wt)
n− t ≤ (wt+1−wt)
C(Wt + (n− t)wt+1)− C(wt)
Wt + (n− t)wt+1 − wt .
Now observe that Wt + (n− t)wt+1 > wt+1 > wt, implying that
C(Wt + (n− t)wt+1)− C(wt)
Wt + (n− t)wt+1 − wt ≤
C(wt+1)− C(wt)
wt+1 − wt .
So
ICi ≤ C(wt) + (wt+1 − wt)C(wt+1)− C(wt)
wt+1 − wt
= C(wt) + C(wt+1)− C(wt)
= C(wt+1) .
uunionsq
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4 Fully Mixed Nash Equilibria
We prove:
Theorem 4 (Existence of Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium). There is al-
ways a fully mixed Nash equilibrium.
Sketch of Proof. Fix any demand vector w. Consider the fully mixed assignment
F, with f ji =
1
m for each pair of an agent i ∈ N and a resource j ∈ M. We
calculate the Conditional Expected Individual Cost of agent i on resource j.
There are two cases.
– Assume first that no agent other than i selects resource j. This occurs with
probability (1− 1m )n−1, and it contributes w1 (1− 1m )n−1 to ICji .
– Fix now any integer k, where 2 ≤ k ≤ n, and assume that k−1 agents other
than i select the resource j. This occurs with probability ( 1m )
k−1(1− 1m )n−k.
There are
(
n−1
k−1
)
pure assignments where exactly k−1 agents (besides i) select
resource j, and each agent t 6= i selects resource j in exactly (n−2k−2) of these
assignments. Thus, the total contribution of all such assignments to ICji is
1
k · ( 1m )k−1(1− 1m )n−k ·
((
n−1
k−1
)
wi +
(
n−2
k−2
)
W−i
)
, where W−i =
∑
t∈N :t6=i wt.
Hence, it follows that
ICji = wi
(
1− 1
m
)n−1
+
n∑
k=2
1
k
(
1
m
)k−1 (
1− 1
m
)n−k ((n− 1
k − 1
)
wi +
(
n− 2
k − 2
)
W−i
)
.
Since ICji is independent of j, it follows that F is a fully mixed Nash equilibrium,
as needed. uunionsq
Call F, with f ji =
1
m for each pair of an agent i ∈ N and resource j ∈ M
from the proof of Theorem 4 the standard fully mixed Nash equilibrium. We next
present a combinatorial proof of a uniqueness property for the standard fully
mixed Nash equilibrium in the case of two agents.
Theorem 5 (Uniqueness of Standard Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium
for n = 2). The standard fully mixed Nash equilibrium is the unique Nash
equilibrium in the case of n = 2 agents with nonidentical demands.
Sketch of Proof. Fix any demand vectorw. Consider any arbitrary Nash equilib-
riumP. We will prove that (necessarily)P = F, the fully mixed Nash equilibrium
from Theorem 4.
We first prove a simple fact, namely that the supports S1 and S2 of agents
1 and 2, respectively, intersect. By way of contradiction, assume otherwise; that
is, assume that S1 ∩ S2 = ∅. Without loss of generality, take that w1 > w2.
Consider any resource ` ∈ S2. Clearly,
IC1 = w1 > w1 +
w2 − w1
2
p`2 = w1(1− p`2) +
w1 + w2
2
p`2 = IC
`
1 ,
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a contradiction to the fact that P is a Nash equilibrium. So, take any resource
j ∈ S1 ∩ S2. Clearly,
IC1 = IC
j
1 = w1(1− pj2) +
w1 + w2
2
pj2 = w1 +
w2 − w1
2
pj2 , and similarly,
IC2 = w2 +
w1 − w2
2
pj1 .
Note that IC1 < w1 and IC2 > w2. We next argue that S1 = S2 =M.
– Assume that there exists a resource k ∈ S1 \ S2. Then ICk1 = w1 > IC1, a
contradiction.
– Assume that there exists a resource k ∈ S2 \ S1. Then ICk2 = w2 < IC2, a
contradiction.
It follows that S1 = S2. Assume that there exists a resource k /∈ S1. Then,
ICk2 = w2 < IC2, a contradiction. It follows that S1 = S2 =M.
Fix now any pair of resources j, k ∈ S1 =M. Since P is a Nash equilibrium,
ICj1 = IC
k
1 , or equivalently w1(1− pj2) + w1 + w22 p
j
2 = w1(1− pj2) + w1 + w22 p
j
2.
or (w2−w1)pj2 = (w2−w1)pk2 , or pj2 = pk2 . Since S2 =M, it follows that pj2 = 1m
for each resource j ∈M. Similarly, we can prove that pj1 = 1m for each resource
j ∈M. So, P = F, as needed. uunionsq
The assumption of nonidentical demands in Theorem 5 is necessary since
every assignment is a Nash equilibrium when the two demands are identical.
Moreover, it does not hold in general that the standard fully mixed Nash equi-
librium is the unique Nash equilibrium. Consider, for example, the case where
n = 3 and m = 2 with w1 = w2; it is easy to see that the mixed assignment
in which agent 1 (resp., agent 2) is assigned to resource 1 (resp., resource 2),
while agent 3 is assigned to each resource with probability 12 is a Nash equilib-
rium (other than the standard fully mixed). We conjecture, however, that the
standard fully mixed Nash equilibrium is always the unique fully mixed Nash
equilibrium.
5 The Price of Anarchy
5.1 Lower Bound
We prove:
Theorem 6. PA ≥ n2e .
Sketch of Proof. Fix any demand vector w. Consider the fully mixed Nash equi-
librium F from Theorem 4 where each pure assignment occurs with the same
probability ( 1m )
n. Note that there are m(m − 1)n−1 pure assignments in which
the agent with maximum demand, say w1, is the unique agent assigned to the
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resource she selects. In these pure assignments, the resource chosen by agent 1
is the resource with maximum Resource Cost. Thus,
SC (w,F) ≥
(
1
m
)n (
m(m− 1)n−1w1
)
=
(
m− 1
m
)n−1
w1 .
Fix now the demand vector w with w1 = Θ(2n) and wi = 1 for all agents
i 6= 1. Then, clearly, w1W ≥ 12 . Proposition 1 implies that OPT(w) = Wn . Hence,
PA ≥ nw1W
(
m−1
m
)n−1 ≥ n2 (m−1m )n−1 ≥ n2e for m = n, as needed. uunionsq
5.2 Upper Bounds
We first prove an upper bound for the special case of 2 agents.
Theorem 7. Assume that n = 2. Then, PA < 2− 1m .
Sketch of Proof. Fix any demand vector w. If w1 = w2 = w, then any (pure or
mixed) assignment has Social Cost w, which is equal to Optimum. In particular,
any Nash equilibrium does so, which implies that PA = 1. So take that w1 > w2,
and consider the fully mixed Nash equilibrium F from Theorem 4, which, by
Proposition 5, is the unique Nash equilibrium in this case.
Note that each pure assignment occurs with the same probability
(
1
m
)2.
Among all m2 pure assignments, there are m(m−1) pure assignments for which
the maximum Resource Cost is w1 (occurring when the two demands are put on
different resources), and m pure assignments for which the maximum Resource
Cost is w1+w22 (occurring when both demands are put on the same resource).
So, SC (w,F) =
(
1
m
)2 (
m(m− 1)w1 +mw1+w22
)
= w1
(
1− 1m
)
+ w1+w22
1
m . Since
OPT(w) = w1+w22 , it follows that PA =
2w1(1− 1m )
w1+w2
+ 1m < 2− 2m + 1m = 2− 1m ,
as needed. uunionsq
We now proceed to the general case of n ≥ 2 agents. We prove:
Theorem 8. PA ≤ w1W · n.
Sketch of Proof. Fix any demand vector w. Note that for any pure assignment
and any resource j ∈M such that nj > 0, W jnj ≤ w1. So, for any Nash equilibrium
P, SC (w,P) = EP
(
maxj∈M W
j
nj
)
≤ w1. So the Price of Anarchy is PA ≤ w1W
n
=
w1
W n, as needed. uunionsq
Theorem 8 immediately implies:
Corollary 1. Assume that for all agents k ∈ N , wk ≤ c · mini wi, for some
constant c > 0. Then, PA ≤ c.
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6 The Diffuse Price of Anarchy
We prove an upper bound on the Diffuse Price of Anarchy for a special case of
the class ∆ of probability distributions for the demands. We start by defining
this special class.
Definition 1 (Bounded, Independent Probability Distributions). The
class of bounded, independent probability distributions ∆ includes all probability
distributions D for which the demands wi, i ∈ N , are independent, identically
distributed random variables such that:
– There is some parameter δD(n) < ∞ such that wi ∈ [0, δD(n)] for each
i ∈ N .
– There is some (universal) constant `∆ > 0 such that
δD(n)
ED(wi) ≤ `∆ for each
i ∈ N .
In our proof, we will use the following general version of Hoeffding bound [7].
Proposition 2 (Hoeffding Bound [7]). Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent ran-
dom variables with ak ≤ Xk ≤ bk, for suitable constants ak and bk, for each
k ≥ 1. Denote X¯ = 1n
∑n
k=1Xk and µ¯ = E(X¯). Then, for any t > 0,
Pr
{
X¯ − µ¯ ≤ −t} ≤ exp( −2n2t2∑n
k=1(bk − ak)2
)
.
Setting t = εµ, where 0 < ε  1, and ak = 0 and bk = δ(n) for each k ≥ 1 in
Proposition 2 yields:
Corollary 2. Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent random variables with 0 ≤ Xk ≤
δ(n), for some suitable δ(n) > 0, for each k ≥ 1. Denote X¯ = 1n
∑n
k=1Xk and
µ¯ = E(X¯). Then, for any t > 0, Pr{X¯ ≤ (1− ε)µ} ≤ exp(−2nε2µ2
δ2(n)
)
.
We are now ready to prove:
Theorem 9. Consider the class ∆ of bounded, independent probability distribu-
tions. Then:
1. DPA∆ ≤ `∆
1− `∆
√
1
2 lnn
+ n exp
(
− nlnn
)
;
2. limn→∞DPA∆ ≤ `∆.
Sketch of Proof. Fix any probability distribution D ∈ ∆. Fix any arbitrary de-
mand vectorw drawn according toD. By Theorem 8, PA ≤ w1
Ŵ
. We will analyze
ED
(
w1
Ŵ
)
. Since all demands are identically distributed, linearity of expectation
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implies that ED
(
Ŵ
)
= ED (w1). So, for any ε > 0,
ED
(
w1
Ŵ
)
≤ max
Ŵ≥(1−ε)ED(Ŵ )
w1
Ŵ
·Pr
{
Ŵ ≥ (1− ε)ED(Ŵ )
}
+ max
Ŵ≤(1−ε)ED(Ŵ )
w1
Ŵ
·Pr
{
Ŵ ≤ (1− ε)ED(Ŵ )
}
Since w1 ≤ δD(n) and by Corollary 2,
ED
(
w1
Ŵ
)
≤ δD(n)
(1− ε)ED(Ŵ )
· 1 + n · exp
(
−2nε2E2D(Ŵ )
δ2(n)
)
≤ δD(n)
(1− ε)ED(w1) · 1 + n · exp
(−2nε2E2D(w1)
δ2(n)
)
≤ `∆
1− ε · 1 + n · exp
(−2nε2
`2∆
)
Setting ε = `∆
√
1
lnn ),
ED
(
w1
Ŵ
)
≤ `∆
1− `∆
√
1
2 lnn
· 1 + n · exp
(
− n
lnn
)
so that limn→∞ ED
(
w1
Ŵ
)
≤ `∆. Since DPA∆ = maxD∈∆ (ED(PA)) and D was
chosen arbitrarily, both claims follow. uunionsq
A special subclass of the class ∆ of bounded, independent probability distri-
butions is the class ∆sym ⊆ ∆ of bounded, independent, expectation-symmetric
probability distributions. For each distribution D ∈ ∆sym, each demand wi is dis-
tributed symmetrically around its expectation; this happens, for example, when
each demand is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, δD(n)]. In this case, for
each demand wi, i ∈ N , ED(wi) = δD(n)2 . So, in this case, `∆sym = 2, and
Theorem 9(2) implies:
Corollary 3. Consider the class ∆sym of bounded, independent, expectation-
symmetric probability distributions. Then, limn→∞DPA∆sym ≤ 2.
7 Discussion and Directions for Future Research
We proposed here a very intuitive and pragmatic cost mechanism for pricing
the competitive usage of resources shared by selfish agents. This mechanism is
both distributed and fair. We presented results for the (pure and mixed) Nash
equilibria of the induced strategic game. We also presented bounds for both
the Price of Anarchy (considering worst-case demands) and the Diffuse Price
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of Anarchy (assuming that demands of agents are drawn according to some
probability distribution from some wide class).
Our Fair Pricing model provides a concrete first step toward a systematic
way of treating such cost mechanisms for pricing the competitive usage of mul-
tiple resources. We are currently examining both more general pricing functions
and heterogeneous cases of selfish agents. We believe that our proof techniques
will be instrumental to obtaining corresponding results for related models and
problems. We also believe that our proposed Diffuse Price of Anarchy is of gen-
eral applicability in congestion games with players’ demands drawn according
to some known probability distribution. In particular, what are bounds on the
Diffuse Price of Anarchy for the Average Cost Pricing model [1] and the Serial
Cost Sharing model [14,15]?
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